# COP 21 Special Newsletter for CILSS/ECOWAS/UEMOA Climate negotiators

***Towards a global climate agreement: a milestone in the Paris Conference negotiations***

Dear negotiators

The entire world is focused on the 21st Conference of parties at the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21) which will take place from November 30 to December 12, 2015 in Paris, France.
This should be a turning point in the international negotiations on climate and lead to an agreement for the limitation of the Global Warming to below 2°C.
The negotiations will deal with various topics such as: the shared vision, the funding and access to the green climate fund, adaptation, losses and damages, transfer of technologies and capacity-building
Our region which is continuously facing extreme climate phenomena such as floods, droughts, hit waves that are progressively frequent and intense according to the international scientific community, should react in Paris.

Thus, you should negotiate on the basis of the common position of the African group and specificities of the sub-region, adopting a strategy for a good implementation of the negotiations in order to invite the international community to better include the concerns of Africa in decision-making on climate issues.

As far as we are concerned, we will support you in this dynamic. In this context, this bulletin is made available and the objective is to identify the technical and economic issues on climate negotiations. It is the result of the collaboration between CILSS, ECOWAS, UEMOA and BOAD in the context of the implementation of the common road map for the preparation of COP 21

We hope this bulletin will be useful in your negotiations and believe they will lead to concrete results, meeting the expectations of West African and Sahelian populations on climate issues.

Good negotiation !

---

M. Kadré Désiré OUEDRAOGO, President of ECOWAS commission
Dr Djimé ADOUM, Executive Secretary of CILSS,
M. Cheikh Hadjibou SOUMARE, President of UEMOA commission,
Monsieur Christian ADOVELANDE, President of BOAD.

## SOMMAIRE

## Coordination

CILSS: Dr. Edwige Botoni, Global Climate Change Alliance Project (AMCC/GCCA) Focal Point (Executive Secretariat, CILSS) and Dr. Benoît SARR, Global Climate Change Alliance Project Regional Coordinator (AMCC/GCCA),CILSS-ECOWAS region,(AGRHYMET Regional Centre)

ECOWAS: Dr. Johnson BOANUH, Environment Director, ECOWAS Commission and Mr. Raoul KOUAME, Coordinator, Climate Change Project, ECOWAS Commission.

UEMOA: Mrs. Zourata OUEDRAOGO LOMPO, Environment Director, UEMOA Commission

## Authors

Olivier Bouyer (Salva Terra), Benoît Sarr (AGRHYMET Regional Centre/CILSS), Edwige Botoni (SE/CILSS), Maguette Kairé (AGRHYMET Regional Centre/CILSS), Philippe Zoungrana (SE/CILSS), Jean Sibiri Ouédraogo (INSAH / CILSS), Cheick Sangaré (INSAH/CILSS), Papa Oumar Dieye (AGRHYMET Regional Centre/CILSS).

## Layout and computer graphics

Boubacar Mainassara Abdoul Aziz and Papa Oumar Dieye (AGRHYMET Regional Centre/CILSS)

*This document was designed with the financial support of the European Union (EU). The content of this publication reflects only the views of the authors. The European Union cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.*

## Foreward

This special bulleting for COP 21 designed by CILSS, ECOWAS, UEMOA and BOAD is especially dedicated to climate negotiators, decision-makers and the civil society from the CILSS/ECOWAS/ UEMOA region but also to any reader who is interested in climate change issues and international negotiations on climate.

This bulletin reminds at first, climate trends as specified in the last report of the IPCC report which is adopted in 2014 and its implications in the strategic sectors for the sub-region that benefits from recent activities of the AGRHYMET Regional Centre/CILSS.

After analyzing the balance sheet of 20 years of Rio negotiation in Lima, while laying emphasizes on the last progress made, this bulletin high-lights (1) the challenges of COP 21 notably on the position of the African Group and the orientations by the CILSS/ECOWAS/UEMOA region regard-ing the negotiation blocs (Shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, funding, capacity-building and transfer of technologies) (ii) identifying the agenda of the Conference of Paris and finally (iii) the analysis of the Intended Na-tionally Determined Contributions (CPDN/INDCs) of West African coun-tries.

## SIGLES ET ACRONYMES

| | |
|---|---|
| ADP | Ad hoc Working Group of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action |
| CSA | Climat Smart Agriculture |
| AILAC | Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean |
| ALBA | Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America |
| AOSIS | Alliance Of Small Island States |
| AR | Assessment Report |
| AWG-KP | Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol |
| AWG-LCA | Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention |
| BASIC | Brazil, South Africa, India and China |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change |
| COP | Conference of Parties |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| CILSS | Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel |
| CMP or COP/MOP | Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol |
| COMIFAC | Central Africa Forests Commission |
| INDC | Intended Nationally Determined Contribution |
| USA | United States of America |
| GEF | Global Environment Fund |
| GCF | Green Climat Fund |
| GHG | Greenhouse Gas |
| IPCC | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change |
| GRULAC | Latin American and Caribbean Group |
| HFC | Hydrofluorocarbons |
| LDCF | Least Developed Countries Fund |
| LEG | Least Developed Countries Expert Group |
| LMDC | Like-Minded Developing Countries |
| NAMA | Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions |
| CDM | Clean Development Mechanism |

| | |
|---|---|
| MRV | Monitoring, Reporting and Verification |
| MtCO2e | Million de tonnes d'équivalent dioxyde de carbone |
| NAZCA | Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| OPEC | Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| NAP | National Adaptation Plan |
| NAPA | National Action Plan for Adaptation |
| TEP | Technical Examination Process |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| KP | Kyoto Protocol |
| LDC | Least Developed Countries |
| QELRO | Quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives |
| RCP | Representative Concentration Pathway |
| REDD+ | Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries |
| TEM | Technical Experts Meeting |
| SBI | Subsidiary Body for Implementation |
| SBSTA | Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice |
| SCCF | Special Climate Change Fund |
| SRES | Special Report on Emissions Scenarios |
| EU | European Union |
| WAEMU | West African Economic and Monetary Union |
| LULUCF | Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry |

# 1. From the Earth Summit in Rio (1992) to the Climate Conference in Warsaw (2013)

## 1.1. Climate change in the world

The natural greenhouse effect maintains the average temperature of the Earth surface at about +15°C. Indeed, the Earth receives and reflects thermal radiations from the sun. Greenhouse gases (GHG) absorb and reflect a part of the thermal radiation reflected by the Earth. Without this natural greenhouse, at constant albedo, the average temperature of the Earth surface would be -18°C. With the observed increase in GHG concentrations in the atmosphere due to human activities, a global average temperature between 16.5 and 19.5°C is expected by 2100 according to the GHG emission scenarios.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ensures the compilation and analysis of thousands of publications concerning the climate. The contributions from three working groups, published in 2013 and 2014, composed the Fifth Assessment Report (Fifth Assessment Report, or AR5 ) of the IPCC.

According to this report, the Earth has warmed by 0.85°C from 1880 to 2012. A rise of 0.19 m in the average sea level has accompanied this warming. There was also an increase in the GHG concentration in the atmosphere, correlated with anthropogenic GHG emissions.




*Figure 1 : (a) Average anomalies of global temperature of the Earth and of the oceans, (b) Global average of sea level changes, (c) Global average concentrations of 3 GHG, (d) Global anthropogenic emissions of GHG (IPCC, 2014).*

IPCC scientists believe that it is highly likely (with a 95% confidence level) that this temperature increase is due to rising concentrations of anthropogenic GHG. In 2007, this linkage was estimated as very likely (with a 90% confidence level) and likely (with a 66% confidence level) in 2001. This awareness does not prevent the phenomenon to occur: on the one hand, we emit more than in 1990 and on the second hand, climate change is characterized by inertia phenomena (the GHG emitted today will keep playing a role in the greenhouse effect for several decades) and even by runaway reactions (the ice melt makes the albedo decrease or drives to the release of carbon previously trapped in the frozen soil, etc.).

Thus, it is necessary to develop GHG effect scenarios. The Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) are the latest IPCC scenarios. These scenarios replace the scenarios of the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) developed in 2000. The inclusion of some mitigation

policies is an innovation of this RCP. It is based on «targets» in terms of radiative forcing in 2100 and allows for calculating the induced warming and the emissions and concentrations driving to these situations. The RCP2.6 scenario is built on the basis on mitigation scenarios of the literature and aims at peaking the global temperature increase at 2° C above pre-industrial level. This scenario reports lower emissions and warming that none of the SRES scenarios of the AR4.




*Figure 2 : GHG concentrations in the SRES and RCP scenarios (Van Ypersele, 2010).*

In terms of emissions, the report of the Working Group III of the IPCC, concerning the mitigation of climate change, indicates that limiting atmospheric GHG concentration at 450ppm by 2100, concentration likely to keep warming below 2°C, means a reduction from 40 to 70% of emissions by 2050 compared to the 2010 levels. It also means emissions closed to zero by 2100. Without additional mitigation effort, the warming in 2100 would be from 3.7°C to 4.8°C compared to pre-industrial levels .

Many impacts that the climate change already has on ecosystems are listed by the IPCC in the AR5: variation in rainfall, snow and ice melt driving to modifications of water systems in terms of quantity and quality, changes in the geographical distribution of terrestrial aquatic and marine species of animals driving to changes in terms of seasonal activities, of migration patterns and of abundance and interactions of species. According to this report, the negative climate change impacts on crop yields are more common than positive impacts.

Since 1950, many changes were observed in terms of extreme weather and climate events. Within the events linked with anthropogenic emissions of GHG, the IPCC notes a strengthening of extreme temperatures, an increase in extreme high tides and in the number of heavy rains in many regions.

The AR5 also warns that the expected climate change will amplify existing risks and create new ones. These risks will be distributed in heterogeneous way and will broadly impact on deprived populations, regardless of the country's level of development. The risk of sudden and irreversible changes also increases with the increase of climate warming.

## 1.2. Climate Change in West Africa: very high risks in a +2°C world

Concerning Africa in particular, the AR5 estimates that analyzes of the decennial temperatures show an increase in the continent's temperatures since 50 to 100 years.

The Agrhymet regional centre (Ly et al., 2013) reported an increase in temperatures between 1960 and 2010 in the West African Sahelian region. Increases of 0.5 to 0.9°C for maximum temperatures and higher than 1°C for minimum temperatures were recorded.




*Figure 3 : Anomalies of minimum (on the left) and maximum (on the right) temperatures in the West African Sahel (Agroclimatic Atlas of the Sahel, Agrhymet Regional Centre, 2015 (a))*

Variability in rainfall has increased (IPCC, 2007 and 2013 and information from Agrhymet-CILSS in 2013, 2014 and 2015). Ly et al. (2013) reported a decreasing trend in rainfall, accompanied by an increase in the frequency of extreme rainfall. As a corollary, the region suffers from more frequent and more intense extreme phenomena linked to water and climate (floods, droughts, heat waves).

The AR5 considers likely that future temperatures will rise faster in Africa than the worldwide average, especially in the driest areas. In a pessimistic scenario, parts of West African Sahel would warm by more than 2°C by 2050. Coastal areas would warm by 1 to 1.5°C (Agrhymet Regional Center, 2015 (b)). Future projections indicate reduced rainfall in the coastal Sahel and increased temperatures of 3 to 4°C in the continental arid and semi arid areas between the last decades of the 20th century and the last decades of the 21st century (Sarr, 2012).

The IPCC (2007 and 2013), estimates very likely that the frequency and intensity of extreme events will increase in the future. Droughts can lead to famines, epidemics, limited access to drinking-water, great migrations and conflicts.

The impacts of climate change will depend on adaptation actions implemented in the affected countries and on the intensity of climate change. Regarding the second aspect, a forthcoming publication of the Agrhymet Regional Centre (2015 (b)) inventories the links between temperature and risks:

- Yields of maize, millet and sorghum decrease with increasing temperature in the tropics. Coffee and cocoa are already experiencing the effects of climate change in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana.

- The extreme events reduce the availability and quality of forages, herd mobility and availability of water. Food consumption by animals is reduced in proportion to the temperature increase.

- For warming values of 2 to 3°C the productivity of tropical forests will be greatly reduced by the combined effects of high temperatures and exacerbated drought (Seguin, 2012). Droughts and heat waves will threaten biodiversity.

- Each additional degree of temperature increases water loss by evaporation of surface water by 8% (Agrhymet regional center, 2015 (b)). Other problems arise, as salinization or reduced quality of available water.

- In the fishing sector, climate change will cause destruction of infrastructures and habitats, loss of biodiversity in mangrove ecosystems and reduce the productivity of coastal farmlands and fisheries. Strong rate of extinction of fish species are expected in the tropics in a +2°C scenario.

 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that each additional degree in temperature increases by 3 to 11% the rate of diarrheal diseases (Agrhymet regional center, 2015 (b)).

 According to Hsiang et al. (2013, in Agrhymet regional center, 2015 (b)), only one unit of standard deviation to warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall would increase by 4% the frequency of violence and by 14% intercommunity conflicts in Africa.

 Lloyd, Kovats and Chalabi, 2011 (in Agrhymet regional center, 2015 (b)) foresee malnutrition rates in the Saharan region from 25 to 90% by 2050 for a global warming scenario of +1.2 to +1.9°C. In Sub-Saharan Africa, climate change will be responsible for the malnutrition of 10 million more children.

The report on the Structured Expert Dialogue on the 2013-2015 review stresses that limiting global warming to +1.5°C would avoid and reduce risks, for example on food production, unique endangered ecosystems (coral, cryosphere, etc.) and rising waters. The risks in a +1,5°C scenario are however less known than those in a +2°C scenario.

## 1.3. The international response: 2008-2012 Kyoto Protocol and failure of the post-2012 global agreement

The first IPCC report published in 1990 revealed the climate change reality. The adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit was the first decisive step of Climate negotiations, as a result of this new awareness. The Convention entered into force in March 1994 after ratification by 195 signatories. From the first Conference of Parties (COP1) held in Berlin in 1995, a set of negotiations has been initiated. The major results of these negotiations are shown in Figure 4.




*Figure 4 : Major steps of climate negotiations (Bedoy et Radanne, 2013)*

The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997. The 40 countries included in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and representing 55 % of the global GHG emissions agreed to reduce their emissions by 5.2 % from 1990 levels, by 2008-2012. In 2013, these countries only represented 40% of global GHG emissions, the major emerging countries, such as China (1st World emitter since 2010), having significantly increased their emissions.

It should be noted that in December 2011, Canada, which took the commitment to reduce by 6 % its GHG emissions, withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol after recorded an increase of 17.5% of its emissions compared to the 1990 levels.

In terms of GHG emissions, most of the countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol have met their commitments: globally, the reduction target has been reached. However, a part of the emission reductions has been achieved without transforming the economies and societies towards more sustainable models, but rather through the massive and forced deindustrialization of the Eastern European countries after 1990, and through the economic current crisis since 2008 . Although the Kyoto Protocol has at least the merit of existing, the trajectory of global warming has not reversed, on the contrary!

Since 2005, the year in which the Kyoto Protocol came into force, the Parties wished to anticipate the post Kyoto (post-2012 regime), discussing two topics:

- The follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol whose first commitment period ended on 12/31/2012. Thus, an Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) has been launched during the Montreal COP11 to define the terms of the Protocol extension ;

- At the same COP11, a «Dialogue on long-term cooperation» was initiated to define the terms of an extended cooperation to all Parties of the UNFCCC to fight against climate change. This dialogue will be strengthened in 2007 by the creation of an Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA).

Two major events marked year 2007. Firstly, the publication of the 4th IPCC Assessment Report (AR4 ) which underlines that limiting global warming to +2°C could be possible with a stabilization of GHG concentrations below 450 ppm. Compared to 1990, this effort means a reduction of emissions of 25-40% by 2020 and 80-95% by 2050 for developed countries. It also means a reduction of emissions of 15-30% by 2020 from developing countries, compared to baseline scenario.

Secondly, in link with this publication, a roadmap for the two years of negotiations (2007- 2009), called “Bali Action Plan” (BAP - decision 1 / CP.13) was designed the same year at the Bali COP13. The BAP aimed at defining the post-2012 regime, and counted on an adoption by 2009.

Five keystones support the BAP:

- **Shared vision**: thematic to discuss the need for a multilateral agreement on the post-2012 climate, with or without numerical targets ;

- **Mitigation**: negotiations about the Parties’ commitments. For example, the United States and Canada claimed commitments for developing countries when the G77+China set against and askrf to tighten up the commitments of developed countries... In its conclusion, the roadmap counted on binding Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives (QELROs) for developed countries and on voluntary Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) for developing countries;

- **Adaptation**: negotiations for the urgent implementation of adaptation actions, particularly for the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the countries of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and for the African countries;

- **Funding**: negotiations on the increase of developed countries’ efforts and on the conditionality of developing countries’ mitigation actions to develop countries’ financing.

 **Technologies transfer**: negotiations on the developed countries' financing of green technologies and on the removal of copyright and patents.

The Copenhagen Conference (COP15) took place in 2009 and coincided with the deadline set in the BAP to achieve a post-2012 regime agreement. Several fences have contributed to the failure of the Conference which did not result to the expected multilateral treaty. 28 countries have signed an unambitious agreement, when other countries opposed strongly, as those of the Bolivarian Alliance (Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela and sympathizers countries).

The only numerical target of this agreement was to limit the warming to +2°C. The agreement does not indicate any target in terms of emissions mitigation, nor legal constraints. In terms of financing, the text counts on a mobilization of US$ 30 billion for the 2010-2012 period and on an allocation of US$ 100 billion per year by 2020 for developing countries, without identifying any sources.

### 1.4. Plan B: looking for a post-2020 global agreement

As a result of the Copenhagen Conference failure and of the negotiation inability to achieve a consensual post-2012 climate regime, negotiations targets have changed. The Parties have tried to close the discussions within the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA groups, beware of not completely stop the negotiation process. The «plan B» option embodies this approach and is aimed at drawing out new negotiations pathways.

The Cancun Conference was above all the occasion to discuss on «how to debate.» Eventually, the goal to keep the process alive was reached. Some progress can even be highlighted:

 the creation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) dedicated to coordinate the financing of the global climate regime. The GCF is currently the largest climate change fund with US$ 10.2 billion funding promises ;

 the recalling of some elements of the Copenhagen Agreement in a Decision (global warming limited to +2°C, common but differentiated responsibility, funding of US$ 30 billion for the period 2010-2012 and US$ 100 billion per year by 2020) ;

 the creation of a NAMA registry, an Adaptation Committee and a Climatic technology center ;

 the improvement of the REDD+ mechanism ;

Eventually, the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA groups concluded their work at COP17 in Durban. COP17 was also the opportunity for the creation of a third negotiation way, called the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. This platform aimed at relaying the two further ways in a situation of stagnated negotiations. To develop a post-2012 regime is no longer the objective of this platform whose target is to reach a single treaty by 2015. This treaty (called the "post-2020 global agreement" in the text below) would enter into force by 2020 and would concern all countries.

However, some countries expected an extension of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012 and the adoption of amendments at the following COP in Doha (COP18). According to them, these two conditions were sine qua non for launching the work of the Durban Platform. In that way, a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in the Doha amendment. It has closed the AWK-KP with low levels of ambition (see section 2.2).

The AWG-LCA has also been closed during the COP18, but many points of the final text remained unfinished. These points were transferred for negotiation under the Subsidiary Bodies of the Convention (SBI) and to the Standing Committee on Finance and the GCF. It especially concerned mitigation actions for developed countries, NAMA, REDD+ mechanism and the enhanced action for adaptation, financing and capacity building.

A calendar aiming at drawing up the future 2015 agreement was adopted during the COP19 in Warsaw. A first draft had to be presented during COP20 in Lima and the final text had to be ready in

May 2015. This text had to be accompanied by a roadmap for the negotiation until December 2015 (COP21 in Paris). The COP19 was the occasion to invite the Parties to elaborate their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). These contributions should highlight the conditionally and unconditionally efforts propounded by each Party to fight against climate change and its effects, regardless to all legal and binding nature of the future agreement. The INDC broadly included the major points of the Bali Action Plan (mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology transfer and also capacity building).

The COP19 in Warsaw also adopted an agreement to raise the level of pre-2020 ambitions in order to fill the commitments gap, limiting global warming to 2°C by the end of the century compared to 1990. The regular mobilization of ministerial bodies is since necessary to carry out the technical reviews of high potential mitigation opportunities necessary to increase the level of ambition.

To push these issues forward (post-2020 agreement and pre-2020 ambition) is the goal of the Ad hoc Working Group of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP).

## 2. Latest developments: from Lima (2014) to now

### 2.1. Progress of negotiations on the five keystones of the BAP

**Shared vision** :

On the basis of the Copenhagen Agreement elements, the Cancun Agreement takes into account the need to limit global warming to 2°C by 2011 and to take urgent action to fulfill this ambition. The goal of 2°C needs to be regularly reviewed and the goal of 1.5°C needs to be considered. The agreement also expects progresses to define a 2050 target and the achievement of an emission peak as soon as possible. Discussions about the shared vision are still going on within the Durban Platform (discussions in the Preamble and in the General/Objectives sections of the global post-2020 agreement text).

**Mitigation** :

Focusing on the Cancun Agreement goal of peaking temperature increase to 2°C or to 1.5°C, the pre-2020 mitigation actions have been translated in:

- Emission reduction commitments for the period 2013-2020 adopted within the Doha amendment («Kyoto 2») by 37 industrialized countries (see section 2.2) ;
- Emission reduction targets that meet the Copenhagen Agreement commitments announced by 42 signatory states. These targets can focus on 2020 but also later on ;
- The pool of the developing countries' NAMA formulated at national level or for specific actions in a register ;
- 57 countries and the Africa group submitted national NAMA. On 2015, 27 October, 13 specific NAMA were at implementation stage (one in South Africa, the only one in Africa) and 149 were at development stage (51 in Africa).

The Convention also requires the periodic publication of national GHG inventories and the promotion of pro-climate technologies. The national communications of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries include inventories and a description of the planned mitigation actions. The Annex 1 countries' Biennial Report and non-Annex 1 countries' Biennial Update Report also include these two elements since the Durban COP17.

Furthermore, since COP19 in Warsaw, a Warsaw Framework for REDD+ has been created. This framework includes 7 decisions on methodological guidance for REDD+.

**Adaptation** :

Since 2005, the Nairobi work program on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation aimed at facilitating and easing the development and the diffusion of information and of knowledge concerning adaptation. An Adaptation Framework was defined by the Parties during the Cancun COP10:

- All parties commit to implement adaptation actions and to report on these actions and on the provided or received support. If the National Action Plans for Adaptation (NAPA) identify urgent adaptation measures to be financed, a process (guidelines, information, support programs, etc.) is implemented to develop National Adaptation Plans (NAP); These NAP have to plan medium and long-term adaptation. For LDC, the NAPA and NAP developments are technically supported by the Least Developed Countries Experts Group (LEG) ;

- The developed countries commit to provide to developing countries long-term, increased, predictable, new and additional supports in terms of financing, technology and capacity building ;

- The Adaptation Committee (information, facilitation of discussion, technical support and recommendations to the COP), regional centers and networks and national institutional arrangements are the institutions involved in this framework.

A work program concerning loss and damage was also created in Cancun. In 2013, this program drove in Warsaw to the Warsaw mechanism on loss and damage (facilitation of information on flows, diffusion of best practices aimed at managing losses and damage in link with climate change, strengthen action and support, including the mobilization of funding). The Executive Committee on International Mechanism Warsaw on loss and damage has for objective to orient the Warsaw mechanism.

**Funding** :

The Convention constrains developed countries (Parties included in Annex 2) to provide financial support to developing countries to implement UNFCCC objectives, on the basis of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and of respective capabilities of the Parties (see Box 1 in Chapter 2.4). Cancun agreements confirm the commitment of these countries to finance up to $ 100 billion a year the implementation of the UNFCCC by developing countries.

The GCF, which aims at coordinate bilateral or multilateral private and public funding, was also created. These funding can be global climate regime grants, concessional loans, loans, etc. The GCF is currently the largest fund on climate change with $ 10.2 billion of funding promises. The GCF should finance in 2016 the first projects to be selected by the GCF Committee in November 2015.

Since the Cancun COP, other decisions about funding mainly concern the developed countries obligation to produce biennial reports for the period 2014-2020. These reports have to detail their efforts to achieve the objective by 2020 and to precise the organization of technical and ministerial meetings concerning funding mobilization.

For the 2013-2020 and post-2020 periods, the origin of the funding, which is a critical point in the negotiations, remains to be identify. Another important element still missing is a clear roadmap to increase financial commitments to the promised annual US $ 100 billion by 2020.

**Technology transfer** :

The Convention expects that developed countries, particularly those mentioned in Annex 2, to take all the measures needed to make the transfer or access to environmentally sound technologies possible for other countries, especially developing countries.

The Technology mechanism is established in Cancun around two bodies:

- The Executive Technology Committee which is a political body aimed at facilitating the technology needs assessments, at producing notes on technologies and at producing recommendations to face issues in access to technology;

- The Climate Technology Network and Center which is an implementing body aimed at providing technical assistance to countries, at making knowledge about the technologies available to all and at promoting stakeholders collaboration.

Right now, no decision has been taken concerning the relationship between the Technology mechanism and the Financial mechanism of the Convention. Such a decision is expected at the COP 21.

The Poznan Strategic Program on Technology Transfer is a program implemented by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Its goal is to facilitate the increase of the funding for technology transfer. It provides support to Climate technology centers and network, guide priority technology projects to encourage innovation and investment, promotes public-private partnerships for technology transfer and finances technological needs assessments. The GEF is identified as a catalytic support institution for technology transfer.

## 2.2. Second commitment period of Kyoto Protocol

The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, from 2013, January 1, to 2020, December 31, is embodied by the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.

A table which specifies the 38 Parties' reduction targets and emission peaking sums up this amendment and replaces the Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol:

| Partie | Year of reference | Commitment |
|---|---|---|
| Australia | 2000 | -0,5% |
| Byelorussia | 1990 | -12% |
| Croatia | 1990 | -20% |
| Iceland | 1990 | -20% |
| Kazakhstan | 1990 | -5% |
| Liechtenstein | 1990 | -16% |
| Monaco | 1990 | -22% |
| Norway | 1990 | -16% |
| Swiss | 1990 | -15,8% |
| European Union (28 members + the Union) | 1990 | -20% |
| Ukraine | 1990 | -24% |

*Table 1 : GHG emission reduction targets for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol*

Japan, Russia and New Zealand are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol but have made no commitment. Otherwise, Canada left the Kyoto Protocol. Canada joined the United States in the elite club of industrialized countries (Annex 1 of the Convention) without binding commitment (and thus non-Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol). This decision is partly explained by the failure of these countries to achieve their targets during the first commitment period .

This second commitment period covers 14% of the global GHG emissions (4 times less than for the first commitment period) and the commitments of the signatory countries represent 18% of their emissions of 1990. Compared with the 1990 level, it means a reduction of 2.5% of the world emissions, in comparison with the reduction of 2.9% targeted during the first commitment period. Thus, the ambition has decreased. IPCC recommended in its fourth assessment report a reduction of 25-40% of emissions from industrialized countries by 2020 compared to 1990!

This amendment will enter into force 90 days after its ratification by the three quarters of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (ie 144 Parties out of 192). Right now, 50 Parties have ratified the amendment. The flexibility mechanisms (quota market, Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation) can still be used, but only by the second commitment period members.

The Doha final text provides that the countries which have taken post-2012 Kyoto commitments would be able to purchase a maximum of 2% of the quotas received for the first commitment period. This restriction aimed at limiting the use of excessive quotas allocated during the first commitment period (hot air).

After the adoption of the text, Australia, EU, Japan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland have declared that they would not buy any reported quotas. Only Ukraine could in fine massively use its own hot air.

It should be noted that a seventh GHG is now taken into account (nitrogen trifluoride - NF3) whose warming potential is 17,000 times the warming potential of $CO_2$ .

## 2.3. Raising the pre-2020 level of ambition

A work plan for raising the level of ambition in terms of mitigation for the pre-2020 period has been initiated by the decision 1/CP.17. Under the ADP workstream 2 about this stake, a draft decision has been discussed in 2015 at the last Bonn Conference, from October 19 to 23. 7 sections are included in the final draft decision:

**Preamble** :

The text underlines the urgency of the implementation of the Convention and its Protocol for raising the pre-2020 ambition. The gap between mitigation targets set by the Parties and the effort required to peaking warming to 2°C or 1.5°C are highlighted.

Many proposals remained in brackets (which mean an absence of consensus). It concerned the reminder of the principles of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (see Box 1 in chapter 2.4), the reminder of the urgency of adaptation measures, the recognition of a special status for LDC and Small Island Developing States, the recognition of the developing countries right for economic development, the need to scale fast, cheap and effective opportunities, as for example REDD+ and renewable energy

**Mitigation** :

The goal is to achieve the most ambitious targets in terms of attenuation for pre-2020 period, especially thank to Technical Examination Process (TEP). This TEP was defined in Warsaw and aimed at technically studying the high mitigation potential measures. In practice, the TEP is based on a series of Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) to evaluate mitigation policies, practices and technologies.

Other measures proposed in the draft decision from the Bonn Conference in 2015, October are the ratification of the Doha amendment by the Parties who «wish to «, new commitments or the increase of the level of ambition of the commitments already made and the publication by the developing countries of their first Biennial Update Report (for the countries who have not already done) and Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of mitigation actions.

Regarding especially compensation and to make the level of ambitious to increase, the text encourages Parties and non-Parties institutions to voluntarily cancel emission reduction units from the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The use made of the flexibility mechanisms also have to be communicated by the Parties, in order to avoid double counting

**Support** :

The absence of consensus is embodies by the brackets of all paragraphs of this section. The urgency of funding, technology and capacity building, especially through financial mechanism, is noticed.

Calendar basis are suggested concerning funding: $ 70 billion per year in 2016 to $ 85 billion per year in 2018, to achieve the $ 100 billion per year by 2020. It is expected that developed countries improve transparency and predictability in the funds flows and that the Standing Committee on funding works on flows MRV.

Finally, a review of gaps of the developed country commitments implementation (financing and mitigation) is proposed for the period 2016-2017.

**Accelerated implementation** :

This section included three options with very different ambitions: Option 1 - accelerated implementation for the period 2016-2020, particularly thanks to a review of pre-2020 commitments for developed countries, to the remove of every conditionality relating to these commitments, to the set of a goal of 40% reduction by developed countries by 2020 compared to 1990 and to the support the implementation of the NAMA; Option 2 - initiation during the COP22 of a facilitative and exploratory process or dialogue concerning opportunities; Option 3 - no text.

**Non-State Actors commitments** :

A full section is dedicated to this subject, welcoming the participation of Non-State Actors. Non-State Actors have to communicate to the Non-State Actor Zone for Climat Action (NAZCA) Platform their actions. These actors are also encouraged to participate in TEP dedicated to mitigation (already existing) and adaptation (proposed in the Adaptation section). A Platform dedicated to the local communities practices and to indigenous peoples is also proposed.

**High-level Event** :

On the basis of the work of TEP (concerning mitigation and adaptation), a high-level commitment is provided during each COP to make the efforts to increase, A bracketed suggestion provides the selection of two «champions» to facilitate high-level commitment.

**Adaptation** :

Two options are included in the part dedicated to adaptation. The first is based on the development of a TE¨P concerning adaptation. This TEP aimed at making possible the identification of opportunities

to reduce vulnerabilities, increasing the actions and support for adaptation, sharing best practices and filling gaps in terms of implementation, knowledge, technology, capacity and funding. The other options, less ambitious, suggest that the Convention institutions learn from the TEP concerning mitigation, and develop relevant processes suitable with their goals.

A debate remains around the consideration of adaptation in the decision. Many developed countries want this subject to be treated apart from workstream 2 of the ADP. Developing countries highlighted the urgency of adaptation actions, stressing that the co-benefits of the mitigation actions in terms of adaptation are a part of the mandate of the workstream 2.

## 2.4. Global post-2020 agreement

### Common but differentiated responsibility

Common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities are included in the principles of the UNFCCC. It was embodied by the creation of Annex 1 (Parties with reducing or restricting GHG emissions commitments) and Annex 2 (Parties with funding commitment aimed at fighting against climate change and its effects) to the Convention.

This principle is not mentioned in the Decision 1/CP.17, decision which have driven to the creation of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. Within the call of Lima for Climate Action , the Parties commit to adopt an ambitious post-2020 global agreement. This agreement has to represent the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and of respective capabilities «in light of different national circumstances «. In a context of different allocation of emissions and wealth, in comparison with 1990, discussions about the interpretation of this principle is included in the negotiations on the post-2020 regime.

Until now, no consensual differentiation criterion has been found. Several options are mentioned in the text for the post-2020 global agreement and in the discussions on it, as differentiation on the basis of historical responsibilities, on ecological footprint, on ability or stage of development, self-differentiation, differentiation between developed and developing countries, referring to the annexes to the UNFCCC (Annex 1 and Annex 2), developing new annexes (no content is available for now), special treatment of «particularly vulnerable» countries, particular commitments for countries «in a position to do so», etc

The last Conference on Climate Change took place in Bonn in 2015, from 19 to 23 October. This was the last step before the COP21 in Paris. The 11th part of the second session of the ADP (ADP2-11) was lead during this conference.

The elaboration of a draft of «package « for the COP21 was lead thank to the tools produced by the co-chairs of ADP. These included a 9-pages draft text for the post-2020 global agreement, based on the text drawn up in Geneva (ADP2-8, in 2015, February, 90 pages) and 11 decisions drafts pages for the workstream 1 (post-2020 agreement, 7 pages) and the workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition, 4 pages).

For many Parties, especially the G77+China and the African Group, the submitted text was not balanced and not acceptable as a basis for negotiation. He was criticized for postponing important decisions after Paris and even do not take in account some of the proposals of the Parties since Geneva.

The core of the work was the addition of elements seen as missing is the text. Unfortunately, some consensus reach previously on the text does not exist anymore and the Parties moved backward on the Geneva text positions. ADP2-9 and 2-10 seems to not have existed, according to some observers. The agreed text has been reduced to 31 pages, with many options sometimes contradictory. No crucial negotiation happened. Nevertheless, the text is shorter and better organized than the text of Geneva. This text and the joint decision draft can be downloaded from the UNFCCC website.

The organization of the negotiations in the form of multiple spin-off groups closed to observers was sharply criticized, especially by the G77+China and by the LMDC group. It was consequently decided that the spin-off groups would be open to observers in Paris.

The text, reviewed by the spin-off groups, will be the basis for future work of the ADP2-12, during the Paris Conference. The co-chairs are entrusted by the Parties with the mission of writing a technical paper for the identification of closely related paragraphs, of redundancies and of opportunities to simplify the text without changing its content.

The G77+China welcomed a more balanced text in comparison to the beginning of the Conference but regretted that parties were unable to finalize the review of a large part of the text. The African Group and the Umbrella Group have meanwhile regretted that the negotiations did not concern the substance of the text, with the exception of Article 2 (Objective). Russia called for the organization of a new round of negotiations, considering that no negotiations were lead in ADP2-11.

Mexico, about to be hit by Hurricane Patricia, underlined the urgency of reaching an agreement and called countries to put their differences aside.

The AILAC and LMDC group expressed satisfaction that the Parties took ownership of the text. The LMDC group also welcomed that the importance of considerate the losses and damages was take into account.

Although the EU, and Bahamas, regret that results do not match up to initial expectations, the EU considerate the text as a good basis for negotiations.

Until now, technical negotiations have been ineffective for developing a draft agreement. High expectations have been deferred on political negotiations, especially during the pre-COP, held from November, 8 to 10 in Paris and gathering 90 ministers. However, some observers fear that this bias contributes to the reduction of ambition.

# 3. Challenges of the Paris Climate Conference (2015)

## 3.1. African Group's negotiating positions

The African Group of negotiators supports the following positions :

All the principles of the UNFCCC must be recognized without prioritization. The principles of equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities must be operationalized by the post-2020 agreement. The post-2020 agreement should be ambitious. It must not represent a weakening of the Convention. The Group criticized the agreement draft text submitted by the ADP co-chairs at the October session, considering it was too weak. It must also contain all the provisions to achieve the objectives of the Convention. Concerning the legal form of the agreement, Africa supports the option of a Protocol.

The transversal and political issues (differentiation, structure of the post-2020 global agreement, transparency of action, legal form of the post-2020 agreement) must be addressed. The Group wants a balanced treatment of issues (mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, financing, technology).

The warming limitation target should be +1.5°C. The emission peak must have a different timing for developed and developing countries. The agreement must include processes to review individual and aggregated mitigation efforts. The draft decision on the enhancement of the pre-2020 ambition must be strengthened with a more ambitious agenda, particularly on mitigation. This component of the ADP's mandate should not be neglected in favour of the post-2020 agreement.

Adaptation and mitigation must be addressed in a balanced way. There should be a global adaptation objective and a mechanism to compensate developing countries for the losses and damages, both related to the lack of ambition with regard to mitigation. NAPs must be developed and implemented and the results of the NAP process, including their implementation, must be communicated, by defining effective reporting means. A Technical Examination Process (TEP) must be applied to adaptation to enhance the pre-2020 ambition.

Funding must be clear, additional, sustainable, adequate, predictable and transparent. It must come from developed / Annex II countries. These countries have to provide clarifications on how they will share the efforts. Individual quantified objectives and a collective quantified short-term target for the path to 2020 must be defined. The financial needs have to be determined by the beneficiaries. Funding should be mainly public but the work with the private sector (banks, pension funds, insurance) must be strengthened and the sources diversified. The procedures for the access of developing countries to the Green Climate Fund should be simplified. Technical support for this access must be provided to the developing countries, including through extending the LEG's mandate.

The Poznan strategic program on technology must be maintained, strengthened and aligned with the Technology Mechanism, including by implementing pilot projects for technology transfer. The funds to finance pilot projects identified following the technology needs assessment must be made available. The global post-2020 agreement should include a framework for technology, covering technologies assessment, options to facilitate the access of developing countries to technology, funding for the implementation, removing barriers and establishing enabling environments for the technology development and transfer.

Capacity building is a prerequisite for the implementation of the Convention. It requires funding, coordination, consistency of supports and harmonization of national priorities in terms of capacity building. The Durban Forum is not an effective platform for capacity building but rather for exchange. Capacity building must have a permanent institutional framework for efforts coordination (implementation) and comparison (monitoring). Thus, performance indicators should be established.

Systems for avoidance and minimization of negative economic and social consequences in developing countries of response measures taken by developed countries must be developed. Collaboration and cooperation among Parties should be strengthened. The topic should be closed quickly.

A transparency framework needs to be developed, applicable to all, but differentiated, taking into account the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, national circumstances and development priorities. The framework should focus on mitigation (including market mechanisms), adaptation, financing, technology development and transfer and capacity building. It is to be financed by developed countries or countries able to do so. Methodologies to be developed should help ensure that the data communicated is complete, transparent, comparable and accurate and that the data collection will be effective. Transparency, currently too limited to action, must be rebalanced and more focused on support. Donors should inform recipient countries when certain funding are presented as «climate-related».

Understanding, prediction and early warning of extreme weather events are essential for climate risk reduction and sustainable development in Africa. Emergency response plans, insurance and safety net systems should be developed. The support (funding, equipment, human resources) must be increased. The national priority in many countries is to feed a rapidly growing population, which means to increase productivity, promote resilient agriculture and improve value chains.

The non-carbon benefits are essential to ensure the long term success of REDD+ programs. These benefits should not be limited to safeguards. They should receive financial support to cover costs, capacity building and technology transfer. The results should benefit from additional funding on the basis of a voluntary validation process of the implementation of non-carbon benefits, which does not compromise national sovereignty.

### 3.2. Orientations adopted by the CILSS/ECOWAS/UEMOA region

CILSS/ECOWAS countries' positions were identified based on the following sources:

- Planning workshop for the preparation of West Africa to the international negotiations on climate changes for 2014 and 2015. July 2014, 21-25. Abuja.
- Workshop for the capacity building of West-African negotiators on climate for the Lima COP20 and for the elaboration of their negotiating positions. October 2014, 8-10, Bamako.
- Niamey declaration on Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) in the agriculture, livestock and forest sectors . April 2015, 28. Niamey.
- Final declaration of the High level forum on Climate smart agriculture. June 2015, 15-18. Bamako.
- Final decisions of the Extraordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government. September 2015, 12. Dakar.
- Preparation workshop of the ECOWAS, WAEMU and CILSS member States to the climate negotiations for the COP21. May 2015, 7-9. Abidjan.

**Generalities** :

The Niamey Declaration recalls that the CILSS / ECOWAS region defend, in all its dimensions, the African common position for the COP21. The Conference of ECOWAS Heads of States and Governments has affirmed its willingness that a fair, equitable and legally binding global agreement is signed, with the engagement of all Parties and based on the principle of Common but differentiated responsibility. In this regard, the 15th Session of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment stated that the agreement should reflect the priorities and aspirations of the continent.

**Mitigation** :

The Niamey Declaration recalls that the CILSS/ECOWAS countries are concerned about the fact that limiting warming to +2°C is not sufficient to significantly limit the impacts of climate change in Africa because it means an average increase of more than +3°C for the major parts of West Africa. The Ministers of the Environment attending the 15th African Ministerial Conference on Environment also indicated that the agreement to be adopted at COP21 must ensure that the mitigation targets allow maintaining the increase of temperatures well below +1.5°C at the end of the century compared to pre-industrial level. Thus, the sub-region calls for an adequate level of emission reduction for developed countries.

The positions also focus on the mitigation measures for the countries of the CILSS/ECOWAS region, consistently with the decision of the High Level Working Programme of Action on climate change in Africa adopted during the twenty -third ordinary session of the Conference of the African Union, which confirms the participation of the continent in the global efforts to mitigate climate change.

Thus, the sub-region calls for (i) the integration of agro-forestry and agriculture in the CDM, (ii) access of all countries of the sub-region to REDD+ existing mechanisms, (iii) taking into account non-market approaches for developing countries and promotion of co-benefits from mitigation, (iv) clarification of what is expected in developing countries' INDC.

**Adaptation** :

Adaptation and its funding are a top priority for the sub-region, particularly through the development and INDC implementation, as mentioned in the Niamey Declaration. The Cairo Declaration, following the 15th African Ministerial Conference on the Environment called for a global target for adaptation, taking into account the needs and costs of adaptation.

The objective for the sub-region is to enhance traditional and indigenous knowledge, capitalize best practices, disseminate climate information and innovations, integrating adaptation into all plans concerning development, the fight against poverty and sectoral plans for more consistency and assess the costs of adaptation as this was not done when developing the NAPA and NAP. During the Abidjan workshop, participants also recalled the needs related to water management and sanitation, and to support sub-regional and national institutions to update climate databases.

Participants to the Abidjan workshop called for the allocation of at least 50% of climate finance for adaptation. This financing must be additional to official development assistance (ODA) and disbursed as grants.

Finally, the Niamey Declaration indicates that the sub-region considers the need to take into account gender issues while addressing adaptation

**Loss and damage** :

During the Abuja and Bamako workshops held in 2014, the sub-region has indicated its desire to integrate all types of slow onset events in the "loss and damage" mechanism, including the provision of specific resources in this mechanism to develop climate insurance. This expectation is reflected in the Niamey Declaration. Thus, the countries of the sub-region want the Warsaw International Mechanism be functional by the development of rules for ex-ante and ex-post compensation and monitoring systems. The mechanism should also be related to adaptation and with existing mechanisms on risks and disasters.

**Finance** :

The sub-region advocates a flexible and easy access to increased resources. The climate needs and financial commitments must be assessed according to the attenuation path and be reviewed periodically. This involves promoting a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for financial flows and needs in the Paris agreement (global post-2020 agreement) and at State level.

The Conference of ECOWAS Heads of States and Governments in September 2015 launched an urgent call for supporting the Green Climate Fund and called for the mobilization of resources announced in Copenhagen for 2020. Participants to the Abidjan workshop have also advanced the position that developed countries need to clarify the path to US$ 100 billion by the COP21, with intermediate targets. The countries of the sub-region also want to see increased financing volumes transiting through the Adaptation Fund.

Beyond these contributions channelled through the UNFCCC funds, the sub-region wants all public financial institutions to redirect their funding to low-carbon and resilient development, with measured and verified positive social and environmental impacts.

The Niamey Declaration indicates that CILSS/ECOWAS countries expect the Secretariat of the Green Climate Fund to accelerate supporting the preparation of countries with rapid access to financial resources, including capacity building and the development of bankable projects in African countries, and to ensure the provision of substantial resources for the agriculture, livestock and forest sectors.

During the Abidjan workshop, participants said they want governance of funding by and for Africa, including country ownership through the creation of national entities, direct access to funding and participation of the African civil society. The CILSS/ECOWAS region asks for more flexible rules for the designation of national entities to have direct access to the Adaptation Fund.

Finally, for these countries, national, local and municipal planning level must integrate 'climate' budgets.

**Technology and capacities** :

The positions of the sub-region include the need for additional support for technology needs assessments (renewable energy and technologies for sustainable land management in particular). This involves addressing the issue of intellectual property rights to ensure effective transfer of low carbon technologies. The Niamey Declaration also indicates needs in terms of capacity building.

**Agriculture :**

Agriculture is a very important theme for the sub-region. In June 2015, in Bamako, a high level Forum on Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) was organized. The final declaration of the Forum formalizes an agreement between States , inter-state organizations , socio-professional stakeholders, technical and financial partners and the private sector for the creation of an Alliance to support the emergence of a framework intervention for CSA development promoted by ECOWAS and UEMOA and a food security policy framework promoted by CILSS.

Since 2014, the sub-region has indeed included in its positions the need to balance adaptation and mitigation, to promote a more productive and sustainable agriculture. A decision is required on the inclusion of agriculture in the negotiations including issues related to CSA, the up-scaling of climate-smart practices, early warning systems, vulnerability and risks assessment for farming systems in relation to different climate scenarios, as well as the identification and evaluation of adaptation practices. These positions are also reflected in the Niamey Declaration.

The inclusion of agriculture in the negotiations must be in line with food security issues. Regarding CSA, the sub-region recalls that the impacts of climate change should not be an excuse to develop an agricultural model based on promoting agribusiness. Family farming and agro-ecological practices should be a priority given their fundamental role in food security and nutrition. Finally, promoted measures must take into account the specificities of the CILSS/ECOWAS countries' agro-ecological specificities (Sahel, oasis, small island States, etc.).

**Land use, land use change and forestry** :

Finally, the Niamey Declaration defends the consideration of land use related issues in the Paris Agreement, given their importance in terms of potential carbon sequestration through land restoration. The Niamey Declaration also commits its promoters to politically support the preparation of the sub-region to benefit from financing and opportunities for REDD+ implementation.

### 3.3. INDC in the CILSS/ECOWAS/UEMOA region

By the 10th of November 2015, amongst the 17 countries of CILSS/ECOWAS region , only Nigeria did not submit its INDC to the UNFCCC . 13 INDC were submitted before the deadline of October the 1st and 3 were submitted three weeks later.

All the INDC set goals for 2030, some also set intermediate targets for 2020 and 2025 (Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Niger and Senegal), or targets for 2050 (Sierra Leone). The reference data are old. They have at best three years (Ivory Coast) and the oldest date from 1994 (Guinea Bissau and Guinea). All the INDC examined include contributions in terms of mitigation and adaptation.

Energy, land use, land use change and forestry and agriculture are major emitting sectors in these countries. Logically they are strongly concerned in these INDC in terms of mitigation measures. Reductions in emissions from energy are identified in each of them. Land use, land use change and forestry are targeted for emission reductions and absorption increases (by reforestation and forest management) in 14 of the 16 INDC. Agriculture is concerned by 11 of them. The other sectors concerned are waste management (9 INDC), transport (5 INDC), industry (4 INDC), mining (1 INDC) and the residential and tertiary sector (1 INDC).

12 INDC quantify their annual emission reductions and sequestration increases, always in comparison to baseline scenarios, with the exception of Guinea that sets a target compared to reference-level (1994). Mitigation objectives are between 0.8 MtCO2e per year (Liberia) and 55.6 MtCO2e per year (Mali, integrating sequestration). Only 4 INDC give the information needed to estimate the cumulative reductions in 2030, between 33.56 MtCO2e (Mauritania) and 162 MtCO2e (Chad). These efforts range from 15% (Liberia) to 71% (Chad) of the projected emissions in 2030.

The submitted INDC are conditioned to the countries' access to financial and technical support. For example, contributions of Guinea-Bissau and Guinea are entirely conditional. Mali is the country that has the highest proportion of unconditional contributions (60%).

The expected emission reductions cannot be aggregated without additional information. Indeed, all INDC do not estimate these reductions and some do not indicate the percentage of unconditional contributions. However, it seems that the reductions announced by the sub-region are at least 240 MtCO2e per year in 2030 of which 67 MtCO2e per year would be unconditional .

All the INDC propose adaptation measures in the agricultural sector (including livestock for 5 INDC), which is the most targeted sector. Water and LULUCF sectors are targeted by adaptation measures in 11 of the 16 studied INDC. Coastal protection measures are identified in 9 INDC and measures for health in 8. Other themes are addressed by less than a third of the INDC, such as fisheries, energy, infrastructure, disaster management, science and urban planning.

4 INDC do not estimate the costs of the programs. The average total budget is US$ 16 billion. It ranges from US$ 742 million (Guinea Bissau without cost estimates for adaptation) to US$ 36 billion (Mali). Thus, at least US$ 178 billion would be needed to finance the contributions of the sub-region. 53% of these needs concern mitigation (budget per country between US$ 700 million and US$ 35 billion) and 46% adaptation (budget per country between 1 and US$ 18 billion).

INDC are a key element of the future agreement, both as pledges of countries to engage and as clarifications on the nature of the actions to be undertaken and the associated implementation means.

To date, the vast majority of countries worldwide have submitted their INDC. On November 5th, 129 contributions were provided, covering about 90% of global emissions. The UNEP reported that the full implementation of 119 INDC communicated before the 1st of October could cause a significant drop in greenhouse gas emissions (-11 GtCO2e) by 2030. Despite this willingness to commit, these efforts are not sufficient to maintain the increase in average temperatures below the target of 2°C by the end of the century. Efforts should be doubled to have a good chance (over 66%) to achieve this goal. However, these estimates might be revised periodically and the level of ambition might be increased.

Three main negotiating issues can be identified regarding the INDC:

Periodic review of the contributions and increase of the level of ambition. One can estimate that this momentum is encouraging and conducive to a climate of trust amongst Parties, few weeks before COP21. West African countries being particularly vulnerable to climate change, periodic review and increasing the level of ambition should be key issues of the negotiations.

Identify funding sources and modalities. In Paris, an important task will be to move forward on the issues of financing, technology transfer and capacity building to help developing countries to implement their contributions.

Progress on the transparency and comparability framework for the INDC. Without common rules, countries have no visibility on the leverage that other countries may have to negotiate. In this situation, all countries are reluctant to engage. Until now, differences of opinions on this issue could not be overcome. This aspect, linked to equity, is crucial for the construction of an ambitious climate regime.

### 3.4. Decrypting the agenda of the Paris Conference

**Overview** :

The Conference will take place in Paris from November 30 to December 11, 2015. It will host the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21, 30/11 to 11/12), the 11th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP11, 30/11 to 11/12), the 43rd meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA43, 01/12 to 04/12) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI43, 01/12 to 04/12) as well as the 12th part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP2-12, unknown dates).

The Conference will be opened on the 30th of November by a Leader Event regrouping Heads of States, so that they can make statements before the opening of the Conference's work. These statements will undoubtedly strongly guide the work for the two following weeks.

The high-level segment will be launched on Monday, December 7, after a week of work.

It is important to note that Parties are invited to limit their intervention to one statement during the Conference . A statement made during the Leader Event will prevent a new declaration of the Party during the high-level segment.

**Post-2020 agreement** :

The major challenge of COP21 is the adoption of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention, applicable to all Parties. The issue will be discussed during the Conference of the Parties, in point 4 (b) of the agenda. The draft agreement and the decision that comes with it can be downloaded from the UNFCCC website.

**Pre-2020 ambition** :

Point 8. of the CMP11 agenda concerns exchanges on increasing the ambition of the Kyoto Protocol, on the basis of a report of the Ministerial High Level Roundtable on strengthening the level of ambition commitments under the Kyoto Protocol . Point 4.(a) of the COP21 agenda concerning the report of the ADP could also address the enhancement of pre-2020 ambition if the draft decision, still under negotiation, is finalized during the ADP2-11. This document may be downloaded from the UNFCCC website.

**Shared vision** :

Exchanges will take place on the «2013-2015 review», a process to assess the adequacy of the overall long-term objective (limiting warming to +2°C) in the light of the ultimate objective of the Convention and to make an inventory of progress in achieving this overall objective. The exercise is based on a report from the Structured Experts Dialogue on the 2013-2015 review . These exchanges will take place within the SBSTA43 (point 8.(b) of the agenda) and SBI43 (point 13.), then the COP21 (point 10.), depending on the results obtained by these subsidiary bodies.

**Adaptation (including agriculture) and loss and damage** :

The mandate of the LEG could be extended by the COP21 (point 16.(b)) on the basis of a draft decision elaborated during the SBI42 . The SBI43 will host exchanges on guidance to provide the LEG with, in point 6. of its agenda. The SBI43 will also prepare a draft decision for submission to the COP21 on monitoring and evaluation of the development and implementation of the NAP (item 7. of the agenda). It will be based on the review of reports prepared by the LEG, the GEF, the GCF, the Adaptation Committee and the Secretariat of the Convention.

Point 7., of the CMP11 will concern the examination the Adaptation Fund report, dealing in particular with the predictability and diversification of funding sources. The Adaptation Fund is partly financed by a tax on CDM credits; therefore its capitalization is subjected to carbon price fluctuations. The report deals with this issue and proposes a draft decision for the CMP11. This draft decision provides in particular for the funding of the Adaptation Fund by levying 10% of the Assigned Amount Units postponed to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

On the basis of a report of the Adaptation Committee dealing with the Green Climate Fund, and in particular the access of developing countries to this fund for the preparation and the NAP update, the SBSTA43 and the SBI43 will prepare conclusions or a draft decision to be submitted during COP21 (point 4. of the SBSTA43 agenda SBSTA43 and 8. of the SBI43 agenda).

In the framework of the Nairobi Work Program, the SBSTA43 will consider - point 3. of its agenda – two documents dealing with adaptation good practices and the progress realised on the implementation of the activities contained in the work plan.

Point 6. of the SBSTA43 agenda concerns agriculture. The SBSTA will analyze reports from workshops concerning warning systems and contingency plans and agricultural systems risks and vulnerabilities.

On loss and damage aspects, the SBSTA43 (point 7. of its agenda) and the SBI43 (point 9. of its agenda) will prepare conclusions or a draft decision to be submitted to COP21, based on a report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage




**Financing** :

Point 12. of the COP21 will deal with financing, divided in 4 items:

- Long-term climate finance (12.(a)) : The COP will study a report on workshops previously organized on financing, notably on including the financing of adaptation, needs of developing countries and supports to the development of enabling environments and preparation activities. Submissions by developed country Parties on increasing funding on the period 2014-2020 will also be examined. The COP will take the necessary measures as deemed appropriate.

- Report of the Standing Committee on Finance (12.(b)), dealing with MRV of funding, guidelines for the GEF and the GCF and links between the Adaptation Fund and other institutions. The COP will examine the report and will take the necessary measures as deemed appropriate.

- Reports of the Green Climate Fund (12.(c)) and of the Global Environment Facility (12.(d)) to the COP, based on which the COP will elaborate recommendations to the GCF and the GEF on policies, priority programs, and criteria of eligibility to access the funds. Other documents will be mobilized, as the report of the Standing Committee on Finance, a report on the operations of the NAMA registry and submissions to the GCF.

The SBSTA43 should elaborate guidelines for the reporting of information related to funding by Annex 1 countries (point 10.(a) of its agenda) and submit them for decision to the COP21, depending of the results obtained.

Finally, the SBSTA43 will address market-based and non-market-based mechanisms, during the point 12. of its agenda. Three issues will be discussed: (i) the Framework for Various Approaches, (ii) New market-based approaches (iii) Non-market-based approaches. Decision 1/CP.18 asked to the SBSTA to propose decisions on these issues for adoption during COP19, but for 3 years, the discussions did not lead to the expected results. These three issues have been the subject of three technical papers in November 2014

**Forests and REDD+** :

COP21 will study three draft decisions prepared by the SBSTA on forests and REDD+ , as part of point 3.(a) of its agenda, concerning the report of the SBSTA. These draft decisions deal with:

- Communication on safeguards for REDD+,

- Alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests

- Methodological issues related to non-carbon benefits resulting from the implementation of REDD+ activities (inviting Parties to submit information on these benefits).

**CDM** :

The CMP11 will examine the annual report of the CDM Executive Board (point 4. of its agenda) and will elaborate recommendations for the CDM. The report is not available for the moment; the next meeting of the CDM Executive Board will take place from the 23rd to the 27th of November 2015.

Decision 7/CMP.10 invites the SBSTA43 to take into consideration a report that the CDM Executive Board will present during the Conference . This report deals with the possibility to integrate revegetation activities (agroforestry and sylvo-pastoral practices in particular) as eligible activities under the CDM. The SBSTA is in charge of the elaboration of a draft decision during its 44th session for adoption during the CMP12. The agenda of the SBSTA43 however evokes the development of a decision for adoption during the CMP11.

Exchanges are in progress under the SBI since its 39th session, to review the CDM rules. Submissions on this matter propose for example:

- To increase Programs of Activities to generate economies of scale,
- To standardize baselines and simplify calculations,
- To create lists of « positive » technologies, reputed additional a priori,
- To ensure a better distribution of the CDM activities, notably in Africa,
- To ensure a better definition of additionality in some sectors (HFC notably),
- To simplify the governance of CDM,
- To clarify the links between CDM, NAMA and other market instruments (sectoral approaches).

So far these discussions have not led to any result and they will continue as part of point 5.(a) of the SBI43's agenda.

The last elements on these exchanges can be found in a technical paper prepared by the Secretariat of the Convention, as well as a Second note prepared by the Co-chairs following the SBI40

**Technology transfer** :

Point 9.(b) of the COP21's agenda concerns the links between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism of the Convention. The works will seek to develop these links and will be based on reports and recommendations from the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the Green Climate Fund. No draft decision is proposed on this topic. This issue is particularly important for the operationalization of the development and transfer of technology.

Based on reports of the Technology Executive Committee and Climate Technology Centre and Network dealing with means to convert Technology Needs Assessments into projects, the SBSTA43 and SBI43 will elaborate a draft decision to be submitted to COP21.

Point 10.(b) of the SBI43 agenda concerns exchanges on actions to be taken to pursue the Poznan Strategic Programme, program involving the GEF and funds from the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) to support investment in technology transfer. These discussions will be based on three reports by the Technology Executive Committee, the GEF and the Climate Technology Centre and Network

**Capacity building** :

Point 11.(a) of the agenda of the SBI43 will examine a draft decision to be submitted to COP21, concerning the content of the 5th meeting of the Durban Forum, the creation of a Capacity Building Committee, the call for the institutions of the Financial Mechanism to finance the needs for capacity building of Parties . Terms of reference for the review of the capacity building framework in the developing countries will also be examined (point 11.(b) of the agenda).

**Gender** :

The topic will be addressed during the SBI 43 (point 14. of its agenda), in the form of exchanges on two reports prepared by the Secretariat of the Convention: one on the composition of the UNFCCC bodies and the second on gender-responsive climate policy.

**National communications** :

The work of the Conference on National Communications from non-Annex 1 countries will be carried out within the SBI43. It will include exchange on ways to consider information from national communications, in conjunction with the Biennial Update Reports and International Consultation and Analysis (point 4.(a) of the agenda of the SBI43). The GEF will also provide information about modalities of access to financing and deadlines for National Communications (point 4 (c) of the agenda of the SBI43).

**Enhanced action on the impacts of the implementation of response measures** :

Point 12 of the agenda of the SBI43 will concern the impacts of response measures, including the work on a draft decision on the Forum and the work program on the impact of response measures , for a potential decision by the COP21.

## References


Agrhymet regional center, 2015 (a). Atlas agrolimatique du Sahel.

Agrhymet regional center, 2015 (b). Vulnérabilité des secteurs stratégiques face à différents scénarii de réchauffement climatique en Afrique de l'Ouest et arguments scientifiques pour la limitation du seuil de réchauffement climatique global à 1,5 °C. A paraître.

Bedoy, G., Radanne, P., 2013. Note de Décryptage - Bilan de la 18 ième session de négociations climatiques. IFDD.

IPCC, 2014. Climate Change 2014 - Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IPCC, 2007. Climate Change 2014 - Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

Ly, M., Traore, S.B., Alhassane, A., Sarr, B., 2013. Evolution of some observed climate extremes in the West African Sahel. Weather and climate extremes 1 (2013) 19-25.

Sarr, B. 2012. Present and future climate change in the semi-arid region of West Africa: a crucial input for practical adaptation in agriculture. Atmos. Sci. Let. 13: 108–112 (2012)

Seguin, B., 2012. « Le changement climatique : conséquences pour les végétaux », Quaderni [En ligne], 71 | Hiver 2009-2010. URL : http://quaderni.revues.org/525

Van Ypersele, J.P., 2010. Update on Scenario Development: from SRES to RCPs.